Gaza
(91)

Report
Dead
(1.1)

Occup
ation

Palestine
(9)

Rockets5)
(33)

State Terror
(0)

Colonisation
(0)

Imperialism
(0)

Information
Production
Theory

Hamas
(60)

Report
Jerusalemad
(47)(0.17)

ISR
(87)

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Echeverría

2021-06-11

Palestine in Ruins and in
Mass Media

Abstract

The first part of this paper proposes a theory to explain how information is used to exert power over people, the second sets out to test its implications. The reasoning begins with conflicting results, in psychology and the social sciences, which imply a tension between polarisation and homogeneity or obedience, in information production. The proposed solution in the specific domain of mass media is called Propaganda Cognition Theory (PCT), as it is a synthesis between a Propaganda Model (PM) in the vein of Herman & Chomsky (2002), and psychological mechanisms such as Identity-Protective Cognition Thesis (ICT) tested by Kahan et al. (2017). The PM-tradition generates results about obedience and homogeneity whereas the latter is associated with findings about polarisation and defiance towards authority. PCT shows that both theories are relevant in special cases, and derives testable hypotheses. This is the first in a series, with data mainly about the occupation of Palestine.

Introduction

There are two sets of seemingly irreconcilable results indicating a fundamental problem in the social sciences and humanities. Previous research over the past decades shows that journalism is homogenous or obedient in favour of those in power[1]. In contrast, results in experimental psychology suggest that polarization should be prevalent in settings corresponding to those confronted by journalists. This paper proposes a parsimonious solution.

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[1] See e.g. Chomsky & Herman (2002);Pedro, (2011a); Mullen, (2010); Bergman, (2014)

In essence, when the propensity to solve a problem is influenced by political considerations. A proper match between a person's political convictions, and the political orientation of the correct solution, increases the probability of a correct answer. Mismatch lowers the probability of a correct answer, and the effect is larger for a more skilled group when the problem is challenging to the subjects. Therefore, when groups with divergent political orientation exist, there will be a polarization in terms of which answer is regarded as correct, even if it means that a group sticks with a position which is contradicted by facts. One key result is that political-identity effect trumps explanations based on cognitive limitations. (See Kahan et al.2017) Similar psychological findings have on numerous occasions been invoked to explain errors among professionals, and appear at first glance to be plausible explanations to account for falsehoods in journalism on complex and politicised topics.

In contrast to common misconceptions, the implications of psychology have also been contemplated in formalised social science, and have a long-standing tradition in economics. Although pioneering efforts to formalise intrinsic motivation were made decades earlier by Japanese scholars, important developments on efficiency-enhancing effects of purpose or motivation matching were made by Besley & Ghatak (2005), and subsequently discussed in relation to organisation and market structure (2010).

Less optimistic perspectives or adverse effects of intrinsic motivation and matching frictions were treated by Canton (2005), and subsequently by Echeverría (2013) in relation to organisational structure and institutional environment.

Furthermore, findings showing astonishing homogeneity in service of power, also seem to be at odds with data from Journalists without Borders, about the state of journalism in democratic countries. In particular results proving the obedience of the Swedish press (see e.g. Echeverría 2018, 2020). Reports

usually rank Sweden and the US among the best performing societies in the world regarding journalism. Results on obedient journalism is in conflict with top-notch rankings in the Freedom of the Press Index – high degree of pluralism, low degree of self-censorship etc. – How can predicted polarization from Experimental Psychology be reconciled with observed homogeneity or obedience in the press? – How can top-notch political pluralism and associated press-freedom rankings be understood in view of subservient homogeneity?

Information Production Theory

Information Production Theory (IPT), as described in this paper, postulates that the institutional setup for production and distribution of information will ensure output satisfies the demands of the masters of the system. The masters are those who control the means of production and key institutions, the state in particular. Accordingly, to rephrase Adam Smith: It is in this manner, that the demand for ideology by the masters of mankind, like for any other commodity of governance, necessarily regulates the production of ideology. While the set of goods and services for power can be produced, distributed and consumed by slaves and masters both, i.e. the set of virtually all members of society, some goods (and bads) of governance aim specific target groups. Ideology is primarily considered as such in what follows.

Differentiated markets, externalities, substitutes, complements, innovation, unintended uses etc. can endow the description of any item in the set of all goods for governance, with intriguing nuanced depth. Like the catalogues of the merchants, the description of the goods is in itself a specialised craft. The art of giving the same name to different things, or conversely, different names the same thing depending on who is going to be informed or misinformed, defines civilized commerce and politics both. Arguing the irony of the latter distinction is humorous but useful if it contributes to the catalogue of science.

Thus, I will not ponder a general theory of the production of power here, as I have made efforts in that direction elsewhere, but restrict attention to the set of testable hypotheses on the supply and demand-side of media output.

Ideology is a good which makes consumers easier to govern. On the supply side, power and social structure interacts with the idiosyncrasies of individual producers of a given media. Rational calculation, intentional control or evolutionary pressure will ensure that even the delicate psychology of producers serves the masters of the system. In the realm of high-stakes politics however, the primacy of social relations is asserted. Obedience or homogeneity results, e.g. in the vein of the Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky. 2002), will usually dominate polarized-outcomes results due to political identity in the vein of Kahan et al. (2017), which in turn dominates cognitive limitations as explanation.

This is postulated also to be true in other domains of information production and processing, such as sections of academia, state bureaucracy and law, film industry etc. Psychological mechanisms and values are also conjectured to be adapted to meet social demands in a similar manner. For a detailed discussion about how varying standardisation of production process, sources, competition, size, organisational structure and psychology can interact, and generate exceptions to the rule, see Echeverría (2013).

The limits to unconstrained dominance is self-defeat. Ideological production has a set of minimum requisites in order to function. If these are not met, then marginal benefits will be lower than marginal cost or no one will buy the product due to sub-standard quality. If the purpose is to sell the idea of accurate independent journalism, then optimal obedience to the demands of the masters must account for pressures towards common decency or at least a minimum pretence of independence.

An important observable limit to obedience emerges when events put pressure on the line of the domestic masters due to the expected or known stance of the international community. E.g. UN condemnation or risk of exclusion from the international journalistic community.

In view of data, journalism typically approaches the ideal of general equilibrium, otherwise unrealistic in various important economic settings. Unexpected events induce merely temporary deviations from equilibrium orientation ordained by the masters of the system.

This is consistent with preservation of the means of power, in order to expand it. In the terminology of the last of the best in the classical tradition, power is accumulated by being invested in social relations, goods and means of production to expand it. If power is denoted P, and ideology I, then the scheme is P–I–P', where P' is greater or equal than P. Where I is more generally ideology, in turn just one technique in the set of all commodities for domination. Accumulation requires standards do not deteriorate below the level necessary for ideological reproduction in terms of socially necessary attention and labour time.

For purpose of exposition, consider a generic propaganda model (PM) synthesized with important psychological mechanisms affecting output; on a given set of topics, outlets and demands from those in power. It is prudent to underscore that both of these research traditions are rigorous, practical and testable, and so is the synthesis, called Propaganda Cognition Thesis (PCT). Consider a challenging topic. Either it triggers polarizing psychological responses or not (YES_T or NO_T). Either there is an agreement in demands from the masters or not ($YES_{A|D}$ or $NO_{A|D}$). Social structure and behavioural responses is characterised by four main cases:

$$\{(YES_T, YES_{A|D}), (YES_T, NO_{A|D}), (NO_T, YES_{A|D}), (NO_T, NO_{A|D})\}$$

<div align="center">**Information Production & PCT**</div>

Polarizing Topic*	Masters Agree & Demand Discourse	
	Yes (Benchmark)	**No (Quasi-Partisan)**
Yes	Homogeneity satisfies master demand. Psychological mechanisms work to increase likelihood of discourse with falsehoods or errors, rhetoric etc. $(YES_T, YES_{A|D})$	Heterogeneity reflects master disagreement**. Psychological mechanisms work to increase likelihood of discourse with falsehoods or errors, rhetoric etc. $(YES_T, NO_{A|D})$
No	Homogeneity satisfies master demand. Other mechanisms, such as Cognitive limitations may generate errors at odds with the master discourse. $(NO_T, YES_{A|D})$	Heterogeneity reflects master disagreement. Other mechanisms, such as Cognitive limitations may generate errors. $(NO_T, NO_{A|D})$
Remarks	*Polarizing topic may not imply polarized output, but zeal to serve. **If such exists. Quasi-Partisans require: Either lack of agreement, demands or both.	

The table captures the interaction between relevant individual psychological mechanisms and social structure as determinants of media outcomes.

The benchmark case emerges when the masters articulate a shared stance, i.e. they agree and make demands, on a polarizing topic $(YES_T, YES_{A|D})$ or on a topic which is not polarizing $(NO_T, YES_{A|D})$. Although the most straightforward, these subcases are important in order to test the theory[2]. If systematic deviations from elite discourse are observed in these cases, e.g. due to polarization, then a propaganda model should be rejected.

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[2] $(YES_T, YES_{A|D})$ should normally be more homogeneous. Journalists are expected to be selected, assigned, trained or motivated in favour of the masters. Errors on key issues will therefore tend to serve elite interests. The conjecture the reverse may be true between these two, if the issue is too complex, is a special case to be settled empirically, e.g. in academia.

Swedish journalism on the Assange case corresponds to (YES$_T$, YES$_{A|D}$) due to the polarizing nature of the allegations, allusions to feminism (YES$_T$); the clear-cut stance from the state, and political pressure from the most powerful countries (YES$_{A|D}$). It is a case in point of how erratic polarizing psychological mechanisms operate in close to perfect harmony when fired along the circuits of a hierarchical social fabric. The resulting output is not polarization in terms of divided and journalism vociferous antagonistic camps, but a synchronised defence of power.

Symptomatically, journalism displayed fact resistance, persistent errors, cognitive dissonance, and a degrading hateful tone at the level of the worst cases of the 'internet mob', who journalists simultaneously tried to associate with Mr. Assange. It was literally more likely for a person to suffer injury from space debris, than the proposition journalism on the case was accurate or anti-establishment (Echeverría, 2020).

The Quasi-Partisan state, containing the cases (YES$_T$, NO$_{A|D}$) and (NO$_T$, NO$_{A|D}$), is a striking candidate as the root cause of much confusion regarding radicalism in media and academia. In particular when unconstrained by master demands. Quasi-Partisans probably constitute the basis of judgement when prominent organisations, such as Journalists without Borders and Freedom of the Press Foundation, declare a high degree of political pluralism in countries like Sweden and the US. The Quasi-Partisans have characteristics which allow journalists to showcase political independence and scientific accuracy which then is facilely extrapolated as a property of journalism in general. Quasi-Partisans are characterised by three cases. Either there is a lack of agreement but a discourse is still desired, i.e. the demands are *divided*; or there is an agreement but no demand, i.e. the agreement is *disinterested*; or there is neither agreement nor demand. In other words, when dealing with Quasi-Partisans, it is necessarily the case that master *agreement*, implies *lack of demand;* and master *demand* implies *disagreement*.

When journalists are motivated by a Quasi-Partisan topic (YES_T, $NO_{A|D}$), then plurality of opinions and ideas are allowed to be expressed with gusto, to the extent journalists can commit errors in order to advance a certain agenda in accordance with political identity. Identity politics and alleged left-wing bias among journalist professionals are issues which fall within this category when not at odds with the desired disagreements, or disinterested agreements of the ruling elites.

Alleged left-wing bias in academia is misplaced for similar reasons. Post-modernists have been allowed to conduct research about identity and power with radical cues, and their work is commonly branded as leftist. From a traditional socialist or Marxist point of view, most of these are of course not even remotely close of being leftists and are seen as contributors to the ideological superstructure in service of the ruling class.

Interestingly enough, researchers from the natural sciences have made similar points. As (Socal & Bricmol, 1998) showed, essential work from renowned postmodernists is unintelligible; an imaginative but incoherent mixture of pseudo-science and radical rhetoric. They point out that the post-modern stance towards science is not quite compatible with a left-wing project.

The co-author of the propaganda model, Noam Chomsky, has subsequently argued along similar lines, pointing out that the post-modern mixture is ideal for the preservation of status quo because resources and attention are diverted from serious critique. Godler (2018) avows by arguing there is a tendency in communication research to maintain the second order prediction, i.e. marginalisation or exclusion of the PM, by replacing it with relativist alternatives which claim similar results but are based on an obscure anti-realist premise.

My own research points towards the same direction. To my surprise, even a world-renowned academic, branded as a leftist activist, turned out to be an intellectual and political fraud. My position is that the role of fake leftists also is an example of how status quo and 'full-spectrum dominance' is achieved by more sinister means aiming to infiltrate, demoralise and disrupt substantial organised transformation of society. It also is a way of redistributing lucrative information and opportunity, from those arbitrarily branded as enemies, to the ruling clique and their subordinates (Echeverría, 2013, 2020a, 2020b). Many discussions surrounding identity politics and political correctness are tactical, and in some cases blatantly orchestrated substitutes for a fundamental debate about academic freedom and power, where all sides advance the agenda of the masters of mankind.

Whereas the first Quasi-Partisan provides plenty of opportunities for political positioning, the second (NO_T, $NO_{A|D}$), offers even more opportunities to showcase accuracy. Journalism may respect the demands of the masters, but in absence of constraining demands, substantially heterogeneous output without falsehoods induced by political identity, is an attractive possibility. Therefore, accurate and seemingly free reporting is likely to be observed. For research purposes, this subcase is adequate as a control. A terrific basis for PR, as Journalists can target audiences by displaying objectivity, scrutiny, and still interest readers.

In view of this discussion, it is conceivable that a distinction between consumers, producers and masters is beneficial when constructing testable hypotheses. Instead of 16 or more (main) cases, the eight outcomes emerging when introducing polarized audiences are enough to make further hypotheses about the optimal polarizing outcomes or revealed preferences of the masters. Is conflict between journalists and audiences desirable regarding certain topics? When is harmony a goal? Which critique of the masters is desirable?

Controlled polarization has rather obvious benefits, and most of the control is feasible with conventional incentives. Serious discussions or inconvenient truths can be crowed out; the legitimacy of the information processing system is improved if its workers seem independent; can discipline the producers; can target political adversaries; partisans attain a sense of representation if they are unable to discern the rigged stage; the masters can ultimately handpick the leaders or 'thinkers' of the camps, who in turn can be made to partially reveal that they are not really serious about their position in order to demoralise, discipline, bolster alienation.

Controlled polarization can even be a way of frustrating and provoking groups to make the mistake of acting exactly as erratic as planned. As unity can be the result of discord and conflict, and sufficient tranquillity and security offers opportunity to rise and challenge status quo, the modes of preferred manipulation vary. None of the aforementioned is remarkably arcane, but when the strategic employment of conventional institutions is refined enough to be democracy-adapted, only a subset of the strategies can be pinned down with certainty by means which meet the demanding requirements of scientific rigour. In what follows, the observability and testability of hypotheses will be discussed.

The demands or agreements of the masters are feasible to acquire under given definitions. Due to the role of the state in public discourse, it serves as a convenient sample of master demands. Explicit statements are conceived as signals to which media and others conform, and seen as an additional constraint. Without such official statements, media and others operate with the usual constraints. This means that it is in principle possible to make plausible inferences about the actual line of the state and the masters when no public statements have been made, by studying patterns in output. However, such inferences are ultimately decided when additional data has been made available e.g. due to leaks.

How is IPT related to the sixth CIA filter proposed by Boyd-Barret (2004)? Intention is reduced to a technicality in this setup. Consider a case when data supports PCT due to sufficient statistical agreement between formal statements and journalistic output. Furthermore, assume the reason for this congruence is deception, with the intention to advance interests in conflict with stated objectives, without raising suspicion. If the plot is exposed, no conceptual inconsistencies are implied because such findings merely underscore the role of institutions and organisations as tools. On the contrary, it is within the realm of plausible conjectures to propose that if the masters someday have incentives to abandon media as we know it, then they will also have incentives to do so by contradicting previous research on the subject in order to start over with a blank slate. At the time of writing however, mass media still obeys simple laws dictated by master demand.

Likewise, lack of data to identify master demand for polarisation or criticism could be supplemented by deduction when categorisation is difficult to make. However, as long data exists for cases without controversy, but still is suitable to test the same general hypotheses, grey-area discussions are either redundant, may serve to test refinements or important for other reasons.

Occupation of Palestine According to Public Service

The bloody Israeli occupation of Palestine involves the most powerful agents of the geopolitical arena, and the ongoing conflict receives world-wide media coverage. These basic facts naturally give rise to questions regarding how power distorts perceptions. Control over perceptions is key in any conflict, both for antagonists and bystanders, thus there are incentives for bias and manipulation.

The state of ideological production gives important clues about the actual position of domestic and foreign agents, and their influence; the status of values and ethics; respect for international law and human rights; and the political culture in general. This is the first study in a series. Forthcoming studies will aim to settle which theory is to be supported or rejected with data on the occupation of Palestine.

Why and how perceptions are managed is central in the study of societies. In western tradition, hypotheses about the correspondence between ideas, self-interest and power are abundant in philosophy, politics and the study of war – from antiquity to the so-called post-industrial era. The conditions of production and distribution of information and their implications are, figuratively speaking, associated with the sub-lunar status of the world of ideas. Hence, empirical studies about media are potentially related to fundamental questions.

Furthermore, this particular study is politically interesting for the following reasons: Swedish Public Service is frequently singled out as leftist or politically correct in favour of disadvantaged groups and minorities, especially of non-European origin. The occupation-driven Palestine-Israel conflict is widely acknowledged to have a corresponding Left-Right political divide, where the Left almost exclusively supports the Palestinian cause.

Related questions involve:

– Is alleged left-wing bias or political correctness present in reporting? What are the implications if the opposite is the case? - Do eventual journalistic distortions correspond to ideological bias or political pressure? - Is the reporting accurate? Which rhetorical or PR techniques can be identified? - Does the overarching narrative conform to the preferences of certain political agents or ideology?

Immediate theoretical interest concerns robust results of previous research, which show journalism conforms to power on important topics such as foreign policy, thus giving strong support to theories in the vein of the Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 2002) or Marxist theories on the ideological superstructure. Swedish data on commercial outlets in the Assange case give an overwhelming support to these traditions. However, *the situation is different in this study*.

Firstly, although SVT is susceptible to flak, dependent on news sources and may be subject to ideological constraints, Public Service has a multifaceted relationship with power. Commercials are banned. The funding is secured for the foreseeable future through taxes under normal circumstances, but is ultimately dependent on political will and preferences. Thus, although not immediately constrained by advertising concerns, there still exists a long-run resource threat point, which curbs divergence from the mainstream.

Secondly, although Swedish foreign policy is sensitive to the US stance there is an accentuated, formal independence, which respects UN resolutions and considers the Palestinian position. The situation differs from the Assange case where the state was directly involved, played a key role in human-rights abuses, and was under heavy political pressure from the US and UK both. Sweden's involvement in the Palestine-Israel conflict is not more exposed to foreign political risk than many other countries within the UN-mainstream.

The less risky position of a so-called balanced stance with calls to put an end to hostilities on both sides may overshadow the duties of self-defence and resistance to occupation also in cases when such perspective is justified. In effect, multiple signals regarding the occupation of Palestine may be expected. A polarized Quasi-Partisan case (YES_T, NO_A) is therefore a plausible conjecture from first principles and limited data.

Commercial media thus seem to have considerable freedom to report accurately and critique the most powerful players in the world, without compromising sensitive domestic concerns on foreign policy or taking excessive risk relative to the international community. Because much of the newsworthiness stems from the conflict, commercial media has an interest to maintain good relations with the Palestinian side as well, which is directly aligned with a profit-maximising motive.

The media environment conditions heterogeneous reporting, of the bloody Israeli occupation of Palestine, in accordance with the official ideological profile of outlets and the political preferences of particular journalists. Omission of facts, selective coverage, fierce rhetoric and distortion is expected along these lines. This does not by any means imply a fair treatment due to imbalances of power and journalistic ties to foreign powers and their agendas. Furthermore, most of the commercial nation-wide newspapers are right wing by Swedish standards. With these reservations in mind, the coverage of Swedish Television faces more constraints. Firstly, it still is perceived to have close ties to the government and the state due to its history, financing, brand and persistent political criticism underscoring such ties. A risk-averse stance may induce a more sensitive approach towards the official state line in anticipation of diplomatic crises. Although more refined conjectures on the matter can be made, it is not a core hypothesis, but an issue which ultimately can be settled empirically without insider knowledge.

Hypotheses

Specific hypotheses about how media will discuss the bloody occupation of Palestine must be formed after the conjecture about the stance of the Swedish state has been settled. See Data and Method. The general hypotheses are:

H₁: Journalism will conform to the government stance.

If the stance of the Government allows media to choose sides:

H₂: Polarization in commercial media in accordance with the predictions of PCT. Formal ideological outlook is allowed, hence expressed.

As the sensitive initial period is covered:

H₃: No systematic deviations from the state line are expected initially as default. Nevertheless, major events may alter the composition within the permitted discourse.

The theoretical merits of testing these is are among other things information about the robustness of the dominant discourse, and how other factors determining observed output, e.g. ideological inclination and risk aversion, compare.

Some questions involve political alignment in terms of left and right, and some insists exact definitions are needed by default. However, it depends on the sensitivity of the conclusions and communication of results to the choice of definitions. No conclusions in this paper depend on such choices on this matter. More mundane reasons underscore that the scientific value added is negligible or negative in this case as the positions of what usually is referred to as the Swedish left & right, are common knowledge. These have been reiterated through the decades on all sectors of society, including the official statements of members of parliament to this day. The situation is similar elsewhere. More generally, there is a long-standing tradition within the exact sciences to focus on relationships between various objects, not the definitions of these objects (e.g. Kac & Ulam, 1992). This proves it is not necessarily a requirement for exactness, even at the highest altitudes of pure reason.

Data

Historically the two channels of the state's media monopoly, Swedish Television (SVT) is still one of the leading outlets on the domestic television market in terms of audience shares. Its homepage is also an important online player with a recorded [Alexa ranking](#) around 3k, according to Wikipedia, and in the interval 8-11.5k more recently (2021-05-16). The average time a visitor spends on this site each day is 2:45. It is this prominent official homepage which will be studied. The news in terms of pictures, videos, texts and other media available on different pages will be referred to as *newslinks*.

The dataset on SVT consists of all news on the Palestine conflict in the homepage's *Foreign*-news section, visible May 16th 20:30 (local time). There are 29 newslinks, all of them with text, 24 with videos. The average length is 72s, median 60s. Only pictures attached to the videos will be analysed; thus, texts and videos are the main objects of study. The average newslink is 321 words, median 359.

The dataset on the position of the Swedish state apparatus is sampled from formal statements from the Ministry and Minister of Foreign Affairs and tweets. Beside the historical common-knowledge document statements, *the sample period* is between April 25 and May 16. The Swedish Ministry of foreign affairs made *no public statements* on the escalation of the conflict under the period on its homepage. It only made *one proper tweet* about the conflict under *the sample period*, and another referring to the Ann Linde about an accident and postponed elections. Minister Linde made *14 tweets* and made numerous appearances on commercial and public-service media.

Method

Quantitative analysis of both text and videos is supplemented with qualitative analysis. Computations are made with specialised software developed by me, most notably a fixed-point search engine; or recognised professional to carry out simulations and statistical inference. Programs and results have been checked with accurate and widely-available software as a benchmark.

The study is initiated with a sample on the position of the Swedish state apparatus consisting of official statements and reported actions. As it is by far the most influential domestic actor in occupation-driven conflict between Israel and Palestine, it is an adequate proxy for master demands.

The first part of the study consists of descriptive statistics about the reporting of the conflict or related to hypothesis testing on the nature of journalism in general in SVT. Subsequent parts will deal with commercial outlets and additional hypotheses concerning comparative statistics.

The Position of the Swedish State

Sweden recognised Palestine October 30 2014 with a public statement published on the homepage of the Ministry for Foreign affairs (SMFA) and in the largest newspaper Dagens Nyheter. The statement recognised the obstacle presented by *new* settlements for a two-state solution with the 1967 borders and Jerusalem as a common capital for Israel and Palestine. The influence of the Swedish state is based on a strong historically-rooted diplomatic tradition and, intensified cooperation with the leading powers under the 20th century, most notably with USA under WWII and the Cold War. Sweden has maintained diplomatic relations with both sides, especially considering US-Israeli relations. Sweden's influence also is underscored by directed stream of payments to the Palestinian side.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has mainly communicated with the public through Minister Ann Linde. Her social-media activities (Twitter) give valuable information about the position of the Government of Sweden and the influences of its current trajectory. Her answers in parliament are shortly after the sample period.

Swedish State Position in Tweets

nr.& Date	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ann Linde #2-#14
#1 5	**Only tweet by SMFA account:** Retweet (rt) about illegal settlements & the Sheikh-Jarrah evictions by Peter Stano, Lead Spokesperson for External Affairs of EU
#2 8	Worried about violence in Jerusalem. rt:s Ned Price, US State Dep. who expresses concerns about al-Shaif/Temple Mount & Sheikh Jarrah. Calls for de-escalation
#3 9	Deeply concerned by violence in East Jerusalem. International humanitarian and human-rights law must be respected. Calls for escalation. rt:s UN Spokesperson Antonio Guterres about occupied East Jerusalem. He urges Israel to cease demolitions & evictions in line with international humanitarian and human-rights law.
#4 11	A tweet in two parts. Part 1/2: About meeting Palestinian ambassador and that status quo must be respected in al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Settlements, evictions and demolitions on occupied territories is against international law.
#5 11	Part 2/2: Missile attacks from Gaza are unacceptable. Such terror against unarmed civilians must stop.
#6 12	Announces appearance in Swedish Radio (P1)
#7-9 12,13,15	Announces appearance in TV4 (commercial, requires app.)

|	
#10 15	Announces interview with nation-wide newspaper SvD (moderate/conservative). Summary: *Denounces Hamas rocket attack, & underscores Israeli settlement policy & evictions in Eastern Jerusalem must end. *Escalation of violence obstacle future negotiations. *Government of Sweden condemns the indiscriminate violence Hamas & other terror groups in Gaza exert. *Israel has the self-evident right to defend itself. *Israel must do its outmost to avoid civilian targets. *Egypt must be supported as a mediator. *The mediators should **1)** be clear on that the spiral of violence must be broken **2)** Two-state solution in the long run. *The position of Sweden and the EU is clear: The settlement policy and evictions of families in Eastern Jerusalem must stop. * When asked about sanctions in general, the Minister answered military interference from the world around is excluded. *Money does not go to Hamas.
#11 15	The mediation by the UN and Egypt must be based on humanitarian and international law.
#12 16	Violence must stop. Children are suffering on both sides
#13 16	rt EU Foreign Affairs: Unacceptable civilian casualties on both sides
#14 16	Supports call at UN Secretary Council by Guterres for cease fire in Israel and Gaza.

Conclusion: Swedish authorities refer to foreign entities from the outset when communicating Israeli occupation of Palestine. The occupation is described in terms of the illegality of settlements and evictions in specific regions such as Eastern Jerusalem and Temple Mount. The restrained articulation follows the outline of the European-Union position about the legal status of the settlements and evictions, which they however clearly state must come to an end. Likewise, the parallel position maintained by UN Antonio Guterres is subsequently acknowledged.

Swedish authorities are very clear when communicating that violence on both sides must end. The Minister for Foreign Affairs conceptualises the violence in terms of a spiral of violence that must be stopped. This approach and stated sentiments are in line with concerns about violence on both sides expressed by US State Department spokeperson Ned Price who calls for a de-escalation.

The Israeli violence specifically criticised is limited to illegal demolitions and evictions. The attacks on Israel attributed to Hamas are condemned as acts of terror against unarmed civilians. Tweet #4 and #5, labelled as one message of two parts but posted as two separate, underscore this double standard. The first part discusses settlements and evictions in terms of respect for 'status quo' and legal status. The former is counterintuitive jargon susceptible to misinterpretations or uninformative to non-experts. Palestinian resistance to the occupation is narrowed down to attacks from Gaza, branded as terror against unarmed civilians in the second.

Expectedly, the terrorist tweet received considerably more attention by the social-media audience within days. This stance is reiterated in an interview with a conservative newspaper. Minister Linde underscores that the Government denounces terror attacks by Hamas, and declares that Israel has a self-evident right to defend itself, but should try to minimise civilian targets. The same message is conveyed in Swedish Radio: Occupation in view of international law, and violence on both sides is accentuated. The Minister shines with masterfully calibrated rhetoric appealing to the more left-leaning public-service audience with an impressive repertoire of eloquent intonations. The tone is fierce when the occupation and the responsibility of Israel is mentioned, then Minister Linde almost fails to articulate her utterance of Palestinian terror. The wording is nevertheless essentially the same.

Killed Palestinian Children via Israeli Settler or Military Presence in Occupied Territory

Killed Palestinian Children (y-axis)

Values by year:
00: 94, 01: 98, 02: 192, 03: 130, 04: 162, 05: 52, 06: 124, 07: 50, 08: 112, 09: 315, 10: 8, 11: 15, 12: 43, 13: 5, 14: 546, 15: 31, 16: 35, 17: 15, 18: 57, 19: 28, 20: 9, 21: 73

Source: Defence for Children International

These statements frame the Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance in terms of deplorable terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, which Israel has the lawful right to defend itself from by attacks on the Palestinians, preferably with a minimum of civilian targets.

In short, the usual war-on-terror discourse employed to legitimise invasion of countries throughout the Middle East is invoked to the letter, including the narrative of saving civilian lives with merciful chirurgical-precision-strikes against terrorists. An understanding insensitive to the fact roughly 100 innocent civilian Palestinian children are killed by Israeli aggression each year on average over the past two decades.

A morbid logical tension haunts the Minister's recommendations on Israeli military tactics. If the Israeli army has the capacity to minimise civilian casualties, then either the going average rate of 100 killed innocent children per annum is deemed minimal, or innocent children are killed as consequence of intentional Israeli calculation.

Logic is hardly needed because, thanks to independent journalism, it has been disclosed that the Israeli army targets civilians as part of their strategy[3]. The publisher of these documents currently faces 175 years in prison for his award-winning journalism.

The alternative reality asserted by the Ministry of Foreign affairs is promoted when the death toll was 132 Palestinians in total, 32 children, and 11 Israeli, according to Swedish Television. When the Israeli bombed the offices of Associated Press and Al Jazeera the following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that children and civilians were dying on both sides, and expressed support for cease fire in Israel and Gaza.

In summary, the position of the Swedish state is a composite of two approaches. One is closely linked to the European Union, and the UN-official Guterres, with emphasis on respect for international law regarding evictions and settlements. Although occupation of certain regions is mentioned in a legalistic manner, Palestinian resistance against occupation by a foreign power is framed in terms of deplorable terrorism, and is subsequently condemned.

The discourse on violence is close to the US State Department, were both sides are urged to stop. The right, or indeed duty of the Palestinian people to resist occupation and aggression, is absent from serious consideration. Israeli violence is deemed legitimate in view of what is labelled as indiscriminate terrorist attacks. Imbalance of power or excessive use of force from Israel is either effectively supported or there is grave cognitive dissonance at work. The Minister sends mixed signals, suitable for different audiences, but with similar wording. No sanctions are supported.

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[3] See e.g. WikiLeaks' PLUSD on IDF commanders speaking out. One admits disproportionate force is used against civilian targets: 'from the Israeli perspective "these are not civilian villages, they are military bases" '.

If media outlets obey the state line to the letter, quantity and quality of journalistic output is characterised by the following:

Acknowledges the legal status of the settlements and evictions in view of international law. **Does not frame** the conflict in terms of legitimate Palestinian resistance to hostile Israeli occupation. **Acknowledges** violence on both sides, portraying Palestinian violence as indiscriminate acts of terror from Hamas or extremists, and Israeli violence as legitimate, measured responses from a state, in order to combat terrorism.

Does not acknowledge the paradox of military humanitarianism when insisting on capacity to perform precision strikes. This either leads to explicit or silent cognitive dissonance in view of rising civilian casualties, justification, or blaming victims.

Due to the mixed stance of the GoS, the safe relative position vis-à-vis the international community, the various political stances on the conflict in parliament, the arms-length distance to the conflict, and the polarising nature of the topic – media coverage in *commercial* outlets is conjectured to display heterogeneity as it resides in the first Quasi-Partisan (YES_T, NO_A).

The following hypothesis is relevant to test: Swedish Television will on average be closer to the government line than commercial media with ideological outlook which challenges the state narrative.

Results

The descriptive statistics begin by exploring data with a set of initial keywords. An initial keyword will find all sentences containing it, and the most common words in these sentences will in turn become the second round of keywords that repeat the search process until it converges to an equilibrium set of frequently used words. In this manner, it is possible to see which are associated with the keywords of interest to begin with, and then retrieve those frequently used overall. Intuitively, it is an exploration from an initial trace which then is guided by following the biggest crowds until the hunt goes in circles and ends up in the same place[4].

The state line asserts that terror is associated with the Palestinians through Hamas, does observed journalism conform to this discourse? Which are the most common words associated with terror? Which are the most frequent words overall? *Terror* is most frequently associated with *Hamas* and *terror-stamped* to an equal extent (13 each), then *Israel's*, *rocket* and *Gaza* (5 each). This tool does not leave much left to the imagination, as a matter of fact, it summarises and anticipates subsequent findings. Terror-stamped Hamas is obviously commonly associated with rockets, Gaza and Israeli possessions or opinions. This association is invariant to the initial number of targets. However, the choice of targeting the top-five is just below the threshold when equilibrium jumps on paths ending with the overall top five in correct order.

The graph below is generated by standard procedure to serve as a benchmark. It is kept basic to avoid arbitrariness. The unrefined sensitivity to inflections nevertheless is representative except on the important topic of *death*, which would have been among the top 5 if similar words had been grouped together.

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[4] It may be instructive to call these tool cats. There are numerous kinds of cats, each with its own demeanor and hunting habits. They stalk and hunt their prey in unique ways. This particular one follows the biggest guys around. The process is referred to as *track/hunt*.

Top 10 Words

This particular hunt on *terror* ends on a fixed point with a view on Gaza (91), Israel (87), Israeli (62), Hamas (60), Israel's (38). The resulting equilibrium set reveals that Israel or the Israeli and Hamas are the main actors in the discourse, Gaza and Israel the places. Figures suggesting a narrative in accordance with the state line.

There are only nine occurrences of *Palestine* in the data, a hunt reveals that it is associated with *Israel and conflict*, i.e. to label the topic as *Israel-Palestine conflict*. Excluding vignette (*Photo*), top-15 left out of the graph are: *Israel's* (38), *persons* (34), *rockets* (33), *Palestinian* (33), *conflict* (30).

Interestingly enough, hunts on *terror* above the five-word-target threshold is accurate on the overall most frequently used words except the word *says*, which is connected to experts and SVT in text. Findings like these hint a central part of what is interesting with these algorithms. Given a procedure and a

dataset, some set of words will tend to repel each other whereas others will attract. Some will exhibit well-behaved convergence to the frequencies of the aggregates above a certain threshold, whereas other paths may even display chaotic and unpredictable behaviour. Some structures are conjectured to have dynamic properties, influenced intentionally as stratagems or by evolutionary pressure from society. Given a social structure, certain set of patterns of information will serve different functions and will be experienced, supplied and demanded by different groups and sections of society. One conceivable adaptation is navigation of consumers along optimal ideological routes with a staged view, guided by master demand.

Overall, *terror* and associated inflections are encountered 15 times, i.e. roughly one every other newslink on average. This keyword appeared in 12 unique items, i.e. 43 % of the newslinks. Most occur in the Swedish word *terror-stamped*, followed by Hamas (13/15).

All instances of *terror* are attributed to the Palestinian side via Hamas. More than half of the newslinks contain these two terms (16/29).

Do the figures reveal something about the geopolitical underpinnings to the conflict? *Occupation* and related inflections are encountered five times. The first 21 newslinks contain three occurrences, each corresponds to a unique newslink. *Terror* is mentioned six times in these newslinks.

Overall, *terror* and *Hamas* are mentioned two and 17 times more than *occupation* respectively. Hamas or terror are seven times more common on the handful newslinks mentioning *occupation*. Nonparametric simulations suggest that *occupation* would be found 18-19 times in 100 newslinks, and *terror* 55-56 times in 100, in 95/100 experiments, related inflections included.

Videos

This section gives similar figures on visual data but is complemented with further statistics on the text of the newslinks accompanying the videos in order to give a comprehensive and representative basis for analysis. The narrative is far from one of legitimate Palestinian resistance to hostile Israeli occupation. Do the videos acknowledge the legal status of the settlements in view of international law?

Two of three videos on the topic of disputed land acknowledge occupied territories but not in direct relation to international law (#3, 4 not #6). Furthermore, this is done with conspicuous reservations. Video #4 features an expert arguing a two-state settlermander[5] where borders are drawn in order to minimise the number of displaced Israeli colonisers, and then evacuate the remaining. In other words, give most settlers what they want.

Video #6 lends support to Israeli harassment of Palestinians on occupied territory. Israeli propaganda on the occupation as a mere property dispute is granted legitimacy with the opening statement 'the law says', not *the Israeli law says*. This is subsequently buttressed by describing the consequences of Israeli colonial evictions on occupied territory, in conflict with international law, as mere opinion of Palestinians. In view of this, the journalist's subsequent point about Palestinian frustration about their political and economic situation, is provokingly silent about the effects of Israeli siege and violence in general. Although two of three technically acknowledge the legal status of the settlements, two of three take a hard line against Palestinians interests. The table below gives a summary of what is explicitly said and shown in the videos.

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[5] Akin to Gerrymander(ing), i.e. choosing electorate borders in order to maximise chance to win, which results in bizarre shapes with some resemblance to every-day things.

nr, Date, length	Video Content SVT May 7-16
#1 7 44s	Palestinians threw rocks, the police responded with rubber bullets & distraction grenades. 18 wounded (BBC). (Police with military rifles or carbines are seen)
#2 9 42s	Stones thrown at police, who reacted with distraction grenades & rubber bullets
#3 9 70s	Why the al-Aqsa mosque is so important. 3 Religions; Violence since Israel occupied East Jerusalem; Emotional centre
#4 10 124s	Expert opinion about two-state solution. Argues that borders should be drawn in a manner minimises the number of settlers displaced, and evacuate the remaining.
#5 10 41s	Hear the sirens. People take cover. Alarm sound after terror-stamped organisation Hamas gave Israel a deadline to remove its security forces from the area surrounding the al-Aqsa mosque. Explosions were heard. 1 pic attached: a Jewish father and his son with a Mickey-mouse cap in front of another family in a background of fleeing people
#6 10 141s	List: Why there is unrest right now. Picture of trouble. 3) The eviction threat in Sheikh Jarrah. *'The law says' Israeli can take back property that they owned before the war 1948. *From the Israeli side, this is seen as a simple property dispute. On the other hand, Palestinians are of the opinion that it is a way of driving them out of East Jerusalem. An emotional Palestinian demonstrator explains that they lived there since 1956[*Law says: 33-41s;*Isr:41-51s.*Pal 52-62s] 2)Frustration in Palestine: Frustration about political and economic problems. [65-85s] 3) The Date: It is common that unrest increases in Ramadan, the holy month of the Muslims. May 10 is the Jerusalem Day. Some Israeli celebrate the takeover of East Jerusalem and the Old City. Spokeperson of Jewish Community of Hebron: Bitter sweet. We are denied rights and instead, Jihad rules this place. Journalist concludes: Shows how deep the disagreements are, and how far away a two-state solution seems to be far away

#7 11 33s	Devastation when a 13-storeyed house collapses. The house is said to have been used by terror-stamped organisation Hamas.
#8 11 60s	Violence has blazed up as many times before. Frustration and escalation of violence are ingredients for uprising. World leaders encourage both sides to calm down. Concerns for a third Intifada.
#9 12 49s	Bombings in Gaza. People ran to air-raid shelters also in Tel Aviv, they took cover from rockets. [4 s picture rockets] War? Yes - war-like. The most extensive bombardments since 2015. Picture Israelis: [28-47]. Civilians will pay the price for a war on Gaza according to the UN. While elderly Jewish man is aided by Israeli medical emergency
#10 12 34s	Shows demolition. 2 pics: 1) Picture of Swedish PM. States that violence between Israel and Hamas must end immediately. 2) Number of casualties rise with rocket- and air attacks between terror-stamped Hamas and Israel's military
#11 12 120s	Gaza Strip [0-42]. Most casualties. Blockade harsh. High-tech weapons strike against specific targets. Example: House where Islamist movement Hamas, who rule Gaza, had an office. Picture of house Implosion associated with 'specific targets'. Ashkelon [42-64]. Rocket attacks. In contrast to Israeli robots, Palestinians have robots which cannot be controlled after launch. Example: Shows residential area and burned out car. Tel Aviv: [65-74]. Picture of a burned-out bus and an explosion-damaged car. More people live here, these attacks may be perceived as additional escalation. Jerusalem [75-97].Rockets and violence on the ground between Palestinians and Israeli.
#12 12 60s	Biden: Israel has the right to defend itself. USA communicates with both. USA is thrown into the conflict. Balance between left and right. The former are with the Palestinians, the latter belong to the majority who stand behind the right to live a secure, calm and safe life.
#13 13 27s	Powerful explosions shook Gaza. Explosions occurred a couple of hours after Israel promised to continue its struggle against Hamas, according to Reuters.

#14 13 60s	Freelance reporter shares anxiety and fears. Life stopped yesterday. On the situation in Gaza. Too afraid to go out
#15 13 60s	Swede outside Tel Aviv. Psychological stress. 45 s to find shelter when the sirens sound.
#16 13 60s	119 killed, 31 kids. 8 Israeli, 1 kid. Covid makes access to Israel hard. Lebanon rockets. Note: statistics last in text & misleading title: Hamas requests new protests
#17 13 100s	Dramatic when Al Jazeera reporter Youmna Al Sayed is live when a 'rocket' strikes a building in front of her.
#18 14 120s	Risk of all-out war. Violence in Israeli cities most troubling according to many experts -risk of sectarian violence with long-term effects. Israel can separate itself from Gaza with barriers, but Jews and Muslims live side by side in Israel. Mob with feedback on social media.
#19 15 47s	Gaza[0-9]. Rockets[10-19]. New rocket launches, at the same time, more victims in bomb raids against Gaza. Beersheba [10-19]. The sirens sounded over cities and forced the civilian population to seek shelter. Gaza [20-28]: Rockets fired at night. [29-44] Explosion and smoke on day. At least 12 people have also been killed after Israeli air raid over Gaza, according to Reuters
#20 15 32s	Swedish demonstrations. No sound at first. Police about demonstrations and so-called pandemic legislation
#21 15 120s	Demonstrations around the world
#22 16 46s	At least 26 killed on the Palestinian side [6-10]. Attacks had 150 different targets, among others the leader of Hamas 23-29]. Hamas has on the other hand fired rockets against Beersheba and Tel Aviv
#23 16 120s	News offices bombed my Israeli army. Interview: CEO AP NY, AlJazeera head & tenant. Depicts professional & human side
#24 16 120s	A man in despair after having lost three children in an Israeli airstrike. Doctor and a rescue worker are given attention. Corresponding human angel about Israel in Tel Aviv and Beersheba. Human and professional side shown.

The second feature of the Foreign-Ministry discourse is closely followed by SVT. Firstly, violence on both sides is acknowledged but with several biases. The following chart summarises the content of the 17 videos reporting violence under the sample period. It is close to the progression, except the second category which in reality is more evenly distributed over time.

Videos Reporting Violence

Length(s)
86	314	34	109	60	60	100	120	120

■ Palestians hostile, Israeli police reacted

■ Hamas/terrorists target Israeli civilians or Israel targets Hamas/terrorists

■ Palestinian Building Destroyed

■ Both sides suffer. War-like situation

■ Palestinian emotions about violence

■ Swedish/Israeli emotions about violence

■ Israeli precision strike avoids nearby Journalist

■ Israel Targets Civilians International Journalists Afflicted

■ Suffering on both sides. Focus on killed Palestinian children

Deaths on the Palestinian side have a marked tendency of being reported with an explanation from Israeli authorities or as a consequence of violence in general. For the sake of transparency, objectivity and representative data as a basis for further analysis, qualitative statements are further quantified with data on the newslink text accompanying the videos.

Death

The rate of attention to Israeli deaths is 1.1 reported/dead, whereas the figure is 0.17/dead for the Palestinians in the text section of the newslinks, computed with the numbers reported by SVT. This statistic reflects what the media outlet nonetheless can be held accountable for. Clearly, Palestinian deaths received disproportionately less attention.

Proportions of Reported Deaths

	ISR	PAL	Ratio ISR/PAL
Times Reported	11	26	42%
Total Deaths*	10	153	7%
Reported/Dead	1,10	0,17	647%

*Total Deaths is the maximal aggregate reported in the sample

This is not necessarily solely a political bias when there only is a handful in one side, and amply on the other. In particular, such discrepancies may be conjectured to even out if the death toll becomes more equal or passes a certain threshold when dead on both sides are perceived as statistics. Thus qualitative aspects of the reports still require more quantification.

The first round of datasets on this issue are all sentences containing *dead*/*death*/*killed*, *victim*, and related inflections. Statistics on this data shows those terms which are directly and closely connected with the description of death. The biggest limitation obviously is some descriptions of deaths will not be in the same sentence. However, these additional descriptions indicate the results below are understatements of the bias.

There are 56 such sentences in total. The first dataset includes those who had some figure about specific deaths on either the Palestinian or Israeli side.

Beginning by excluding loose assessments such as more, increasing and most, there are 37 tidy. This omission is not a big limitation, and those omitted reinforce findings. The table below summarises the findings but understates the bias in favour of the Israeli side.

Death by Association

– Who is Killed, Blamed & Kills?

	SIDE	IDENTITY	TERRORCON	WHOKILLED
SIDE	1	-0,10	0,37	0,17
IDENTITY	0,10	1	-0,03	-0,05
TERRORCON	-0,37	-0,03	1	0,19
WHOKILLED	-0,17	-0,05	0,19	1

***PAL Correlations** in 1st row, ISR correl. 1st column.
SIDE: ISR = 0; PAL = 1. **IDENTITY**: Generic = 0; specific description = 1 (incl. 'victim'). **TERRORCON**: None = 0; Terror association or Excuses for Enemy = 1.
WHOKILLED: Generic or None=0; Enemy=1

Whereas the videos have conspicuous descriptions of Palestinian deaths as the result of violence in general, identification of victims and perpetrators are secondary in text. Instead, the main discriminatory feature is the association of Palestinian victims with terrorism, or to bestow exculpatory reasons for their cause of death. More precisely, Palestinian deaths are positively correlated with terror attributed to their side, or exculpating circumstance for the enemy side, including Israeli responses against terrorists.

Nevertheless, Palestinian deaths are *weakly* negatively correlated with identifiers such as gender, age, 'victim' etc. Instead, killed Palestinians tend to get generic labels such as 'persons' or 'people'.

Conversely, killed Israeli are *slightly* more readily given identity; neither associated with terrorism on their side nor are enemy killers given excuses; and are *somewhat* less associated with identification of the perpetrators.

However, Palestinian deaths are positively correlated with identification of perpetrator in the sample. This finding underscores the relevance of the other correlations between factors.

Two of the discriminatory practices have conflicting effects on identification of killer. One is, like in the videos, to speak in terms closer to metadata about Palestinians deaths, which also tends to obfuscate the killers. The other is the association of Palestinian deaths with terrorism or give excuses for their deaths. In contrast, this practice is positively correlated with identification of the killers, partly owing to a framing approaching a simplistic good-vs.-evil narrative. The latter tendency prevails.

Killed given identity are *slightly* less associated with terrorism on 'your side' or exculpating factors for their killers. Killed given identity are *slightly* less associated with identification of killer.

Nonparametric simulations show the extent of the understatement regarding terrorism. However, the basic tendencies remain.

Estimated Probability by Variable

	ISR	PAL
P(Identity)	70 %	59 %
P(Terror)	0 %	37 %
P(Who Killed)	40 %	63 %

* Nonparametric point estimates. See appendix for CI

These probabilities can be compared with confidence, without further ado, due to the large number of simulations. Israelis are more likely to be given specific identity when killed; zero probability of guilt by association vis-à-vis terror, nor are excuses given in favour of their enemies when killed; however, their killers are considerable less likely to be identified. (See Appendix)

Note that these probabilities are for associations within a given sentence exactly as explained above. To get an additional angle on the bias, two inflections (died & lost life) with only 12 hits were initially left out and then the preceding paragraph was checked. In summary the first six paragraphs describing violence are about rockets from terrorists and Israeli retaliation. All three expressions 'have lost their lives' are attributed to Israeli victims at first. It is not until after the news offices in Gaza are hit that the expression is used to describe the brutal misery of a man, Mohammed, who lost his wife and three children in an Israeli airstrike. When added to the data, guilt by association on the Palestinians side increases. However, this terror-branding tendency is even sharper when the set is restricted not with words but in time. Before the bombings of journalist offices, the correlation between killed Palestinians and terror or excuses for their deaths is about 0.4 (see Appendix).

These findings indicate that the sides in the conflict are important for the incidence of the obituary. Therefore, the dead are not treated as equals. Given the context, denouncing Israeli violence on a given newslink would be prone to appear as defending terrorists or troublemakers. This narrative is furthermore reinforced by the detailed figures on relatively much more frequently reported Israeli victims.

Secondly, the Palestinian violence is consistently portrayed as indiscriminate acts of terror afflicting civilians, whereas the Israeli violence is consistently portrayed as controlled attacks against specific targets, terrorists groups in particular. This tendency is accentuated in the visual data as this perspective is emphasised in half of the videos (#1,2,5,7,9,10,11,12,13,17,19,22).

Summary & Conclusions

Swedish Television (SVT) was hypothesised to supply journalism to meet the demands from the state. The set of reports and opinions from SVT closely corresponds to the set of strategic foreign-policy doctrines articulated by Minister for Foreign Affairs Ann Linde. This strategic communication can be understood as a set with four key elements.

Firstly, it acknowledges the legal status of settlements and eviction in view of international law, and so did SVT. Secondly, it does not frame the conflict in terms of legitimate resistance to hostile Israeli occupation, and neither did SVT. Thirdly, the state acknowledges violence on both sides, but depicts Palestinian violence as indiscriminate acts of terror, whereas Israeli violence is seen as legitimate responses against specific enemy targets. SVT follows this narrative closely. Finally, the state does not acknowledge the paradox of military humanitarianism when insisting on Israeli violence in terms of precision strikes. This was conjectured to result in silence or passive cognitive dissonance, or justification by blaming the victims. SVT did both, the latter in particular. Analysis of videos were supplemented with analysis of texts in the newslinks, the results remain the same.

Important quantitative and qualitative aspects of the bias are summarised by probabilities characterising the media-obituary of the fallen. Palestinian victims are less likely to be given identity, more likely to be discriminated by association to terror or excuses for their killers, but are more likely to have their killers identified. The latter should be understood in a context where terrorism is positively correlated with identification of killer. The variables (*SIDE* excluded) are close to independent and weakly correlated otherwise.

These findings support H_1, which cannot be rejected. More detailed statistical inferences in line with Echeverría (2020) have meagre scientific value added at this point due to the clear-cut results. Nevertheless, such exercises are not excluded in future contributions. However, there is a tendency of more impartial and empathic reporting after Israeli air raids against internationally acclaimed media outlets. A finding in line with H_3 but should be regarded as a preliminary result

A closer analysis of video #17 succinctly captures the communication strategy. The immanent rhetoric is highlighted when an explosion in front of a shocked journalist is labelled as a 'rocket' by SVT. Rockets are closely associated with Hamas and attacks on Israel:

Rockets (33) – Hamas (29) – Gaza (27) – Israel (25) – Aviv (16).

However if the viewer for some reason associates the scene with an Israeli attack, then it is against a backdrop consistently emphasising Israeli military retaliations against specific terrorist targets, Hamas in particular. To give an additional example, a hunt on *target* has the following initial associations:

Target (15) – Gaza (8) – Hamas (7) – Israel (7) – Military (5).

A discouraging implication is hinted by the seemingly unsuspecting optimistic prescription to focus on cease fire in the short run, in order to deal with Israeli occupation in the long run. The occupation will continue to be resisted, thus escalation of conflicts will most likely recurrently erupt. Therefore, a future stream of pretexts to postpone the dismantling of the occupation is a rational expectation. Without sanctions or resolute action from the international community against the colonial power, the incentives will remain the same, thus the incentives to continue with the current course of action will likely remain unaltered. The unequal media narrative on violence is deceptive about the state of the world today, but as it stands, it appears to be a remarkably

accurate prediction of the future. The terms currently employed are rather suitable to describe future evictions of tenants, deemed illegal by domestic rulings in unfortunate conflict with international law, subsequently enforced by police, but disrupted by acts of violence from discontent terrorist groups. A scenario indistinguishable from a domestic affair within the borders of a singular sovereign state.

All results are completely at odds with claims about left-wing bias in Swedish public service. On the contrary, the recurrent blaming of Palestinian victims by association, combined with passivity, and the explicit distinctions made between Palestinian and Israeli violence go beyond the official stance of the state. It is in fact a stance traditionally pursued in right-wing circles in a Swedish setting. In view of H_3, this may be informative of the default political orientation allowed to thrive in absence of clear directives from those in power.

Considering the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, alleged left-wing bias in public service remains a claim as wild as any other groundless conspiracy theory. If accounts about self-reported left-wing affiliation within Swedish Television are accurate, then either journalists have no idea of what left-wing means or other mechanisms inducing censorship and obedience towards power are at work. Such findings would potentially underscore the influence of the masters of mankind and are consistent with the 'conspiracy against the public', to paraphrase Adam Smith. However, human resource or micro management, and adaptation to pressures from societal constraints, are less dramatic complementary explanations.

The fixed-point search engine is not only useful to pin down the narrative. Research conducted with this tool suggests that data displays interesting dynamic properties. Further research is needed to explore attractors, convergence, turbulence, and the chaos of information production.

The figures presented in this paper are accurate but will nevertheless be perfected and compared with refinements and new software concepts. These will continue to aim at tractability and control, closely related to theory and hypothesis testing. This is the first part in a series to develop and test which theory best explains mass media. Future prospects in this line of research remain promising.

Appendix

Alexa-ranking SVT: #11:450 2021-05-16. Average time in minutes and seconds that a visitor spends on this site each day 2:45. According to WikipediA: #3550. Sweden's most popular tabloid Aftonbladet: #3049

https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/svt.se

Omitted data about death are not contrary to the conclusions, but rather reinforce them. Three observations with specific but inadequate total numbers were among the omitted. Two of them unspecific about side and identity (30 and 76 'persons'/'people'). The third contained info about 50 people, mostly Palestinian. However it was associated with Hamas, which in turn is associated with almost all occurrences of terror and its inflections. There are four occurrences about rising numbers of casualties. The first at the beginning is as expected generic, the rest at the end of the dataset. These are much more humanising because the dead are identified as victims. Six sentences make different remarks about death in general, without asserting number of deaths. Finally, one mentions a woman without additional info.

There are also two referring to the death toll and the 'Palestine-Israel conflict' in general without reference to specific deaths, emphasising violence on both sides, and associated with the vignette to photos. There is also one similar about Gaza.

There was only one omission when 12 preceding paragraphs were checked – a general remark about the victims of the conflict.

The variables IDENTITY, TERRORCON and WHOKILLED have low correlations. Spearman-Rank tests show that the H0 of independence cannot be rejected. This test has the greatest power among the usual independence tests.

	TERRORCON	WHOKILLED
IDENTITY	0.95	0.95
TERRORCON	–	0.58

P-values for H0:Independence.

Therefore, non-parametric probability estimates reflect overall frequencies, and can be used to make inferences about the profile, e.g. the probability of a terror-associated, but otherwise anonymous Palestinian victim. 100 000 simulations yield narrow confidence intervals with a size less than one percentage point with normal approximation.

Correlations restricted datasets. The use of the term *side* is congruent with how it is used in by SVT-journalists in the dataset, and how it usually is used in this setting. 1) Some inflections omitted, n= xx.

	SIDE*	IDENTITY	TERRORCON	WHOKILLED
SIDE	1	**-0,221**	**0,221**	**-0,086**
IDENTITY	**0,221**	1	-0,018	-0,034
TERRORCON	**-0,221**	-0,018	1	0,034
WHOKILLED	**0,086**	-0,034	0,034	1

*__PAL Correlations__ in 1st row, ISR correl. 1st column.
SIDE: ISR = 0; PAL = 1. **IDENTITY**: Generic = 0; specific description = 1 (incl. 'victim'). **TERRORCON**: None = 0; Terror association or Excuses for Enemy = 1.
WHOKILLED: Generic or None=0; Enemy=1

2) Restricted to the time before Israeli air raid against journalists.

	IDENTITY	TERRORCON	WHOKILLED
Palestinian Correlations	-0,18	**0,41**	0,30

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Defence for Children International Palestine

https://www.dci-palestine.org/

Newslinks

Newslink date is given by the Swedish convention (YYYY-MM-$D_P D_P$/$D_U D_U$), where $D_P D_P$/$D_U D_U$ indicates first published or updated. When several are published on the same day, a-z indicates order.

SVT. (2021-05-07/11). Många skadade vid al-Aqsamoskén i Jerusalem

SVT. (2021-05-08/11). Efter oroligheterna – förhandling om vräkningar i Jerusalem skjuts upp.

SVT. (2021-05-09/16). Därför är al-Aqsamoskén så viktig i konflikten

SVT. (2021-05-10a/11). Hundratals till sjukhus – oroligheter i Jerusalem

SVT. (2021-05-10b/11). Analys: Våldet i Jerusalem – en explosiv cocktail

SVT. (2021-05-10c/11). Raketer avfyrade mot Jerusalem

SVT. (2021-05-10d/11). Lista: Därför är det oroligt i Jerusalem just nu

SVT. (2021-05-11a/12). Uppgifter: Hundratals israeliska luftangrepp mot Gaza i natt

SVT. (2021-05-11b/11). SVT:s Stina Blomgren: "Oro för en tredje intifada"

SVT. (2021-05-12a/12). SVT:s utrikeskorrespondent: Civila som får betala vid fullskaligt krig

SVT. (2021-05-12b/13). Här rasar ytterligare ett höghus i Gaza

SVT. (2021-05-12c). Stad för stad – så attackeras Israel och palestinier

SVT. (2021-05-12d/13). Biden i samtal med Netanyahu: "Rätt att försvara sig"

SVT. (2021-05-13a/13). Fortsatta attacker i natt – Israel hotar med markoffensiv

SVT. (2021-05-13b/13). Frilansreportern i Gaza: "För rädd för att gå ut"

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SVT. (2021-05-13d/14). Hamas uppmanar till nya protester i dag

SVT. (2021-05-13e). Här sänder Al Jazeera-reportern mitt under explosionen

SVT. (2021-05-14a/14). Våldet sprider sig på Israels gator – fördöms av Netanyahu

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SVT. (2021-05-15a/16). Nya raketangrepp mot Israel – svarar med bomber mot Gaza

SVT. (2021-05-15b). Propalestinska demonstrationer på flera håll i Sverige

SVT. (2021-05-15c/16). Protester världen över efter upptrappningen i Gaza

SVT. (2021-05-15d/16). Biden i samtal med Benjamin Netanyahu och Mahmoud Abbas

SVT. (2021-05-16a/16). Antalet dödsoffer stiger – medlingsförsök fruktlösa

SVT. (2021-05-16b). Minst 23 personer dödade i israelisk flygräd mot Gaza

SVT. (2021-05-16c/16). Kritik mot Israel efter bombning av redaktionsbyggnad

SVT. (2021-05-16d/16). Mohammed förlorade tre barn i israeliskt luftangrepp

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