Prequel trilogy Common Sense 3 to 1 below.
Discrepancies in military and diplomatic strength between the adversaries create an asymmetric dynamic with potential to ignite unprecedented destruction… the likely victor by means of military conquest is remarkably likely to become the weakest part in terms of diplomatic relations in the post-war period. When Soviet Russia defeated the Nazi machine, its military prowess and sacrifice translated to an acknowledgement of its sphere of influence…This time around, even in the event of an overwhelming military victory, Russia may still face tight diplomatic isolation, hostile neighbours and crippling economic sanctions.
– Common Sense I, March 2022
Abstract
This paper dismantles the main arguments for Swedish NATO membership from the most illustrious advocates. None of the conclusions in favour of NATO presented by the Government in the May 13 report survive scrutiny. In conclusion, even if the assumptions are taken at face-value, it does not follow that NATO will enhance Swedish security. Official pro-NATO arguments rely on a naïve understanding of international relations, contracts and incentives. Analysis of the incentive structure of so-called binding agreements reveals that the NATO mechanism does not guarantee as much as commonly advertised. NATO is a deficient insurance for Sweden as it increases the risk of worst-case scenarios while current threats, as assessed by the May 13 report, remain minor as non-aligned. Finally, the historical arguments from NATO advocates, only strengthen the case for non-alignment.
Keywords: NATO; Contract theory; Governance; Review
As any simple brawler can confess, the capacity to violence is not a good guarantee for not getting involved in it. Sweden will make itself a target if it joins
– NATO without Reason
This paper benefits from previous posts in the series Common Sense (III, II to I.), originally posted on FB between February 25 and March 15 2022.
Note: Date is year of publication, for archive.
COMMON SENSE III
If mainstream historical records are to be believed, the Russia-Ukraine war is one of the most expected conflicts in modern history. All major players expected Russia to take this course of action, and Russia expected that they expected it. This is not only evident from historical records, it was also indicated by the statements made at the outset. Here is a relevant sample: USA explicitly said their ‘forces are not and will not be engaged in the conflict’[1]. China remarked it would not give military support to Russia…[2] The EU was even vaguer than usual[3].
As anticipated, military aid and sanctions were subsequently executed. This course of action is standard in the history of conflicts, especially concerning Russia. Such actions are not necessarily precursors to direct military involvement with troops.
What the powers of the world expect is that tension due to NATO over-expansion eastwards, at a time when post-Soviet Russia was in ruins, has to be accommodated to reflect the underlying tenets of international relations, i.e. raw power. They do not expect irrational Russian westward expansion with negative net benefit for the aggressor. This is a sad moment for civilians, it is unfair they have become pieces in a brutal game, but that is the reality of the situation at hand.
More exact assessments? – An option of a fixed-price electricity deal for 3 years as an insurance.
Two particular pernicious misunderstandings about foreign policy circulate among expert commentators. Firstly it is a gross miscalculation regarding MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). Secondly it is on the rationality of joining NATO as a neutral country. Both issues can have catastrophic repercussions. Below, clarification which should be common knowledge.[4]
Considerations akin to MAD are central to carry out the chain of thought which constitutes a country’s strategy.
COMMON KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MAD
To recommend increased pressure against a nuclear power arguing their announced deterrent is not credible due to assured retaliation from the US or other NATO members is worryingly sloppy. This is especially the case considering two common-knowledge factors:
(1) The US has a sheltered position, and could e.g. encourage another Anglo-Saxon dominated continent to abstain from escalation, securing a fairly unspoiled wealth of ‘economic’ resources, human resources and infrastructure.
(2) Tactical nukes for ‘trespassing’ in the zone of conflict could increase incentives to defer from mutually-assured destruction and retaliation, as such course of action (i) has been signaled from the outset (ii) are more limited in their collateral.
Clearly, these common-knowledge circumstances have far-reaching implications for the underlying strategic interaction and rationale of MAD. Considerations akin to MAD are central to carry out the chain of thought which constitutes a country’s strategy. Misconceptions about MAD reflect confusion about deterrents, and how the powers of the world are likely to act. It may also reveal deception, ideology or emotions among the elite. Regrettably, it seems to be a common flaw in the understanding of surprisingly many so-called expert commentators.
Why denial and, in this context, modest retaliation? Most saliently because post-conflict western-Ukrainian relations; signaling about the demarcation line; and incentives to increase Russia’s costs of waging war, at relatively low cost, with a proxy war. But without invoking WWIII with direct confrontation.
COMMON KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NATO
Joining a military alliance is a long-term commitment which should not be decided on short-term considerations, alarmism in particular. The current conflict cannot suddenly be a good-enough reason to join, as it perhaps is the most expected one in modern history.
The argument Russia attacked Ukraine because it is not a member of NATO is ridiculous as the conflict is about Ukrainian tendencies to join. Thus if one believes it is about membership, and that factor can be extended to other countries, the following is focal for the sake of consistency: what triggers Russian attack is WHEN A GIVEN COUNTRY WANTS TO JOIN NATO. However, such comparisons are inadequate without serious thought, as the strategic circumstances differ. The current conflict is primarily about geopolitical considerations: eastward NATO expansion and a Russian buffer zone.
Even more obvious, USA and its allies are world-renowned when it comes to aggression at will. Military intervention in the current conflict effectively is WWIII and plausibly the destruction of civilization, which is a deterrent. That deterrent also keeps Russia from irrational westward expansion. It is obvious that both sides acknowledge this threat.
Why denial and, in this context, modest retaliation? Most saliently because post-conflict western-Ukrainian relations; signaling about the demarcation line; and incentives to increase Russia’s costs of waging war, at relatively low cost, with a proxy war. But without invoking WWIII with direct confrontation.
Therefore, joining NATO because of perceptions of a new Russian threat clearly is contrary to the beliefs consistent with the course of action of NATO! And to reiterate, against the stated beliefs and actions of the most powerful actors on the planet.
OTHER COMMON INCONSISTENCIES
Even if you are unable to distinguish long- and short-term objectives, certain military strategist are not. For example: Military aid to Ukraine from a neutral country is offensive. It is interpreted as a way to prolong the conflict and hostile, but also as a signal of expected future reciprocity in the event the neutral country is attacked. Joining NATO would enhance the former, but undermine the latter signal. Moreover, initiative could be lost under increased central command and so would credible benefit of doubt when joining. Hostile manoeuvres would be interpreted in terms of an element in a long-term plan to contain or wage war against Russia. The difference cannot be overemphasised.
Media outlets claiming Russia was unable to meet its objectives against Ukraine, but simultaneously claimed Russia posed a threat, even against countries beyond its vicinity. This is in most plausible contingencies absurd. In view of previous arguments, insane in a discourse about invasion.
Peace is the best course of action, but requires embracing multi-polarity, and halting the expansion of the most powerful military alliance in the world.
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/24/politics/us-troops-ukraine-russia-nato/index.html
[2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1321
[3] https://www.rt.com/russia/550450-china-comments-on-russian-operation/ The source is accurate on this statement, and is easily checked if in doubt.
[4] Text first posted: First section 2022-
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